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PACS numbers:
Digital signature schemes provide message authentication which enables third parties to settle disputes about the authenticity of messages. In Ref. [1] Zeng and Keitel proposed a quantum signature scheme that requires the availability of a trusted arbitrator as part of the signature initialization and verification algorithms. In our opinion, the protocol is not well operationally defined, its presentation is misleading, and several steps are ambiguous. Moreover, we believe that the security statements claimed by the authors are incorrect. We first list the main points of our criticism and then provide more details.
The scheme proposed in Ref. [1] has as its goal to sign a quantum state |P . From the paper, however, it is not clear whether the sender (Alice), the receiver (Bob), or the arbitrator, need to know the identity of the quantum state |P to be signed, or whether they have access to a restricted number of copies of an unknown state |P . One of the main motivations for the work presented in Ref. [1] is that "classical signature schemes are difficult to assign to messages in qubit format". Then, one might be tempted to assume that none of the parties involved in the communication has a classical description of the state |P . However, it is well known that signing unknown quantum messages is not possible [2] . One can then consider that all the parties know the state |P . This assumption renders the quantum signature scheme proposed in Ref. [1] to one intended to sign classical data using quantum resources. However, in this scenario it is unclear what are the real advantages of this protocol, if any, with respect to unconditionally secure classical signature schemes (see, e.g., Ref. [3] and references therein). Finally, one can assume the natural scenario where Bob (or even the arbitrator) do not know the state |P . However, as we will show below, the signature scheme proposed in Ref. [1] is insecure in this last case [4] .
In several crucial points of the protocol a step of state comparison is required . Especially, if Bob does not know the state |P to be signed, he would have to compare two unknown states. The authors of Ref. [1] did not clarify in their manuscript how to perform these quantum state comparison steps, and they treat them as deterministic and error-free processes. However, it is evident from the no-cloning theorem [5] to be impossible to do universal quantum state comparison in a deterministic way and without disturbing the original states. For a quantitative analysis of this scenario see Ref. [6] , where the optimal comparison test and its success probability have been recently obtained.
Let us now discuss our criticism in more detail. We start with a brief description of the protocol. The scheme includes three phases [1] : an initial phase, a signing phase, and a verification phase. In the first one, Alice, Bob, and the arbitrator distribute two secret keys, K a (Alice-arbitrator) and K b (Bob-arbitrator). These two secret keys might consist of quantum states or of classical data. Next, they create and distribute GHZ states. The distribution of GHZ states has to be repeated for every single communication: the "algorithm relies crucially on the entanglement of the three involved communicators". In this Comment we will consider that this initial phase can be completed in a safe manner, although the authors of Ref. [1] do not present any specific protocol to verify the correct execution of entanglement distribution.
The signing phase can be used to sign pure n-qubit messages of the form |P = n i=1 (α i |0 + β i |1 ). The signature of |P , denoted as |S , is defined as a quantum encryption of some classical data M a and a quantum state |R . In order to encrypt this information Ref. [1] proposes to use the "approach known as 'quantum state operation'". It remains unclear what the authors mean with "quantum state operation", but a quantum onetime-pad scheme might be used for this purpose [7] . More important, in this step it is not clearly defined how the crucial quantum state |R is generated by Alice. First, it seems that Alice uses K a to select a set of "measurement operators" M Ka . If K a denotes a quantum state |K a , then M Ka must contain |K a as an eigenvector. Note, however, that in this scenario it remains unclear how Alice can obtain M Ka from |K a if she does not have a classical description of the quantum state |K a . If K a is a classical key then M Ka can represent any measure-ment operator within a given set indexed by K a . Next, the sentence "Alice is required to measure the information string of qubits |P using M Ka and obtains |R " seems to indicate that |R arises from a measurement on |P , i.e., M Ka is an observable. Note, however, that in this case the protocol can only work probabilistically. After receiving an advance copy of this manuscript, the authors of Ref. [1] emphasized that M Ka denotes a unitary transformation [8] . Therefore, from now on we will consider that |R = M Ka |P with M Ka unitary.
The verification algorithm requires the arbitrator to obtain a parameter γ arising from a forgery test. In order to do that, he needs to generate two quantum states, |R and |R ′ , that need to be compared (Step 2 in the verification phase). If |R and |R ′ are different, then γ = 0 and |P has to be rejected. Otherwise γ = 1 and Bob needs to perform a second verification test. Here, again, it is not clearly stated how does the arbitrator obtain these two states |R and |R ′ from M b , |S , and |P sent by Bob. More important, as pointed out above, the authors of Ref. [1] do not explain how the quantum state comparison test between |R and |R ′ is performed. Once the first forgery test introduced above concludes, the arbitrator needs to obtain a parameter M t . The procedure to generate M t is a bit misleading . Ref. [1] claims that "the arbitrator measures or evaluates the states of the particles in his string of GHZ states". Again, here it is not clear the meaning of "evaluates". Once M t is obtained, whatever the process involved, the arbitrator prepares a quantum state y tb containing part of the information obtained in the previous steps of the protocol and he sends it to Bob.
Depending on the contents of y tb , Bob needs to decide whether the message originates from Alice or not. This constitutes the last step of the verification phase. Now Bob has to compare the quantum state |P with a state |P ′ . "If |P ′ = |P , the signature is completely correct and Bob accepts |P , otherwise, he rejects it". Again, at this crucial point we find the problem of how to obtain the quantum states |P and |P ′ from y tb , and how to realize the quantum state comparison test.
Next, we show that the protocol presented in Ref.
[1] cannot lead to a secure signature scheme if Bob and the arbitrator do not know the state |P . To simplify our notation, we shall mainly consider one-qubit messages, i.e., |P = α|0 + β|1 .
To obtain the parameter M a , Alice performs a Bell measurement on a copy of the state |P and her particle of the GHZ state. Let us assume, for instance, that M a corresponds to the state |Ψ − 12 a (see Eq. (8) in Ref. [1] ), which will always occur with probability 1/4, and that |R has been obtained as |R = M Ka |P , with M Ka denoting a unitary transformation. The correlations of the GHZ state impose, in this case, that the state shared by Bob and the arbitrator is |ϕ = α|00 − β|11 .
The verification phase begins once Bob receives |P and |S from Alice. Here Bob measures his particle of |ϕ in the x direction. The result is recorded in the parameter M b . The state |ϕ = α|00 − β|11 can be written as |ϕ = 1/ √ 2(| + x σ Z |P + | − x |P ), where | ± x = 1/ √ 2(|0 ± |1 ), and σ Z is the Pauli matrix (σ Z |0 = |0 and σ Z |1 = −|1 ). Both possible results, {| ± x }, have equal a priori probability 1/2. Let us consider, for instance, that M b = | + x . The state of the arbitrator's particle is then reduced to σ Z |P .
Next, Bob sends y b = K b (M b , |S , |P ) to the arbitrator. With this information the arbitrator performs his forgery test. Now, in order to obtain |R and |R ′ , we consider two possible alternatives. On the one hand, to evaluate if the message received by Bob is authentic, it seems that |R and |R ′ should depend on |P and |S . That is, |R originates from |P as |R = M Ka |P , and |R ′ from |S (or vice versa). On the other hand, the authors of Ref. [1] ) assert that the decryption of |S "gives rise to |R ′ via the correlations of the GHZ state". One might then also think that |R ′ (or |R ) arises from the GHZ particle of the arbitrator, and |R (or |R ′ ) from |S or |P . Note that by using the correlations M a (contained in |S ), and M b the arbitrator can find that his particle is in the state σ Z |P . Then he could recover |P applying σ Z (σ 2 Z = I). More important, once the arbitrator obtains |R and |R ′ , whatever the process involved, he needs to compare these two unknown quantum states to decide whether they are equal or not. Unfortunately, it is known that it is impossible to conclusively identify two pure unknown states as being identical [6] . Nevertheless, one can perform a measurement that examines whether the systems are not the same [6] . Let q denote the average success probability of identifying two pure unknown states as different. With this comparison procedure no valid messages will produce γ = 0, but we find that a forged message will be accepted with probability 1 − q. For one-qubit messages we have that q = 1/4 [6] . Here we consider that |R and |R ′ are selected at random within the set of all pure states. For n-qubit messages the value of q depends on M Ka . Ref. [1] 
|p i |s i , Now a potential adversary could follow, for instance, an strategy that do not modify all the n qubits contained in |P , but only a small fraction m of them. This is sufficient to achieve a dramatic decrease of the quantum fidelity [9] of the resulting quantum state with respect to the original message |P . In the worse-case-scenario (m = 1) the arbitrator will accept a forged message with probability 3/4. One can improve the ability of detecting forged messages by using a general unitary transformation M Ka . Unfortunately, even for this scenario the value of q is relative low: q = 1/2 (1 − 2 −n ) [6] . As a consequence, we find that a possible attacker (which includes as well a potential dishonest Bob) could modify Alice's messages such that the acceptance parameter γ satisfies γ = 1 with non negligible probability. Moreover, note that so far we always assumed that |R and |R ′ are pure states. A better security analysis against an adversary that sends mixed states, would also be necessary here.
From now on, we shall presume that Bob is honest and we evaluate his forgery test. For simplicity, we will consider that the comparison process described above can be accomplished without disturbing the original states.
After calculating γ, the arbitrator needs to obtain the parameter M t . "Note that M t may be | + x or | − x ". It seems, therefore, that to obtain M t ∈ {| ± x } the authors of Ref. [1] require that the arbitrator measures his particle of the GHZ state in the x direction. Furthermore, in Ref. [1] it is specifically mentioned that "the arbitrator may choose an appropriate sequence of measurement operators to measure his GHZ particle". Once this measurement is performed, the arbitrator sends Bob the state
Bob does not know Alice's secret key K a . This means that from y tb he cannot obtain the message |P anymore. Note that |P cannot be calculated from M a , M b , and M t alone: the parameters M a and M b are completely independent of |P , whereas M t = | ± x only means that |P is not orthogonal to | ∓ x (assuming that the arbitrator's particle was σ Z |P ). To avoid this problem in the protocol, let us assume for the moment that y tb also includes the message |P , or that Bob can have access to a copy of the state |P somehow. Now the last step of the verification phase takes place. Here Bob has to compare |P with a state |P ′ . "If |P ′ = |P , the signature is completely correct and Bob accepts |P , otherwise, he rejects it". In order to obtain |P ′ Bob must use the parameters M a , M b and M t . Note that "|P ′ is obtained from a calculation and not a physical measurement, because Bob's particle has already been measured in the first step of the verification phase". But, as pointed out above, from M a , M b , and M t , Bob might obtain a |P ′ different from |P even for valid messages. Note that the result of a measurement (M t ) on a quantum state (σ Z |P ) does not completely identify the original state. In fact, one may even assume that the arbitrator does not measure his particle of the GHZ state. Instead, he sends it to Bob in place of the parameter M t . Unfortunately, we end up again with the problem of comparing two unknown quantum states. This comparison test can produce the acceptance of forged messages with non negligible probability.
So far we have shown that the quantum signature scheme proposed in Ref. [1] is unable to guarantee security against a dishonest Bob or a possible attacker in the natural scenario where |P is only known to the signer Alice. Moreover, we have shown that, even in the absence of dishonest parties, this scheme, as originally proposed, does not allow Bob to recover the message |P sent by Alice. After having access to this manuscript, Zeng and Keitel acknowledged that in their work they need to "reasonably assume that Alice, Bob, and the arbitrator know the message |P " beforehand [8] . Unfortunately, this crucial point for their scheme is not mentioned at all in their original manuscript, and it constitutes a severe limitation for the possible applicability of this protocol in a practical communication scenario. With this strong assumption, now one could modify the protocol in Ref. [1] and substitute the parameter M t by the original GHZ particle of the arbitrator such that Bob can obtain |P ′ (from his knowledge of M a and M b ) and compare it with the known |P . Moreover, in the signing phase Alice would not need to send Bob the quantum state |P anymore, but only its signature |S . However, it seems to us that this scheme would be rather inefficient and expensive in terms of the quantum resources needed to perform this particular task. In the literature there are already unconditionally secure classical signature schemes to sign classical information, with or without arbitrator, that moreover consider the natural scenario where the message to be signed does not need to be publicly known beforehand [3] . In fact, if we assume the availability of a trusted arbitrator, Alice and Bob could as well use classical message authentication codes [10] to sign their messages [11] . Therefore, we believe that in this case it would be necessary that the authors of Ref. [1] clarify the relevance of their scheme in a practical communication scenario together with its real advantages, if any, with respect to unconditionally secure classical signature protocols.
